

"To care for him who has borne the battle, and for his widow and orphans."

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ATLANTA CAMPAIGN.

Masterly Monographs From a Trench-ant Pen.

CORRESPONDENTS.

Some Side-Views of William Tecumseh Sherman.

THE EFFECTIVES.

A Magnificent Spectacle and the Excitement of the Contest.

By

O. O. Howard
Major-General.



II.-RESCUE.

T TIMES DURING the war it was difficult for certain journals to keep their correspondents with the army. If anything improper or calculated to give undue information crept into print and into circulation, the Commanding General held the newspaper man nearest at hand accountable. Often he was peremptorily banished from the front, or so treated that he could not successfully report. Latterly in the war the difficulties were lessened. Correspondents obtained positions as Additional Aids, or some enterprising junior staff officer undertook to write regularly to a public journal, thus doing double duty.

For example, Capt. D. P. Conyngham, an Irish officer who published a book after the war, was in the Twenty-third Corps, on Gen. Judah's staff. He also corresponded regularly with the New York Herald. I mention him particularly because he was present at the battle of Resaca, and has given some characteristic pen-sketches of many prominent actors in that battle.

That Gen. Sherman, who had often been misrepresented by correspondents, and had become impatient over it, was not at this time very friendly to newspaper men, appears in Conyngham's sketch of him. The evening of May 13, with but one staff officer, Gen. Sherman joined McPherson in Sugar Valley. Conyngham says: "He was anxious and nervous, as was evident from the fierce manner he pulled at his moustache, and twined that strange, rough face of his."

In another place he says: "He has little reserve in concealing his opinions of other officers." He had worked hard all night after his arrival near Resaca. Sherman was then

GREATLY DISAPPOINTED.

With his intense confidence in McPherson and his Army of the Tennessee, Sherman had believed that Confederate Johnston's force would be before this driven into a broken and disastrous retreat; but by McPherson's pulling back to Sugar Valley the whole program was changed. Now a big battle must be fought at Resaca against an entrenched position. I will give a scene just west of Resaca, as the correspondent presents it:

"Next day (the 14th of May, 1864), weary and sleepy, he sat on a log beside a shady tree to rest himself, and soon fell asleep. He had but a single orderly



GEN. JOS. B. McPHERSON.

with him. Some man in passing made an insinuating comment, ending with: 'A pretty way we are commanded.' Sherman, awakened by the noise of passing men, overheard the accusing remark. 'Stop, my man,' he called; 'while you were sleeping last night I was planning for you, sir, and now I am but taking a nap.'"

A little later, when several Generals had gathered around him, he was told that Johnston had evacuated Rocky Face Ridge and Dalton, and that Kilpatrick had been wounded. I had the night before brought the first item of this news, so that Sherman already knew that Dalton had fallen. Now, reflecting upon the situation at Resaca, according to the correspondent, he said:

"Well, we must get them out of this,


too. McPherson, had you held this position when you first occupied it, they [the Confederates] would find themselves in a nice trap."

"Yes, General," replied McPherson; "I found my flank exposed and open to them by good roads, while I had not a single road by which reinforcements could come up if attacked; so I fell back to a stronger position."

"Oh, pshaw!" said Sherman. "It can't be helped now, though."

Gen. Thomas was with Sherman that morning. The lively Irish Captain looked upon THOMAS'S STURDY FACE and wrote:

"Maj.-Gen. Thomas is quite the reverse of Sherman, both in manner and appearance. He is tall, stout, with brawny frame and shoulders. His head is slightly bent forward, as if drooping



with care and thought. [This was temporary, for habitually Thomas's head was erect.] His hair and beard, which he wears cut pretty short, are rather dark and slightly sprinkled with gray. He is about 50 years of age, and looks his age fully. * * *

"As a General Thomas is calm and cautious; does everything by rule; leaves nothing to chance. He makes his arrangements for a battle with caution and foresight, and is sure to have every column and division move with



GEN. LEONIDAS POLK, C. S. A.

clock-work regularity, and strike at the proper time and place. Nothing disturbs or unnerves him."

I regard this as a fair picture of Gen. Thomas as I saw him that weary morning when we were bringing our corps into position before Resaca, except the idea conveyed that he was a mere machine man. His intellect was active enough at all times while devising or planning, but firm and steady when a decision had been arrived at. He was, however, like most Regulars, thoroughly subordinate. He earnestly scolded Gen. Sherman in all his undertakings, whether they happened to be just in accordance with his own judgment or not.

While these newspaper sketches were being afforded and taken on a prominent point of observation between Resaca and Taylor's Ridge, the troops were struggling through the ravines and thickets into a position encircling Johnston's lines, which before my arrival were already firmly established. Joseph E. Johnston, speaking of Resaca, says:

"The two armies [Sherman's and his own] were formed in front of Resaca nearly at the same time, so that the Federal army could give battle on equal terms, except as to numbers, by

ATTACKING PROMPTLY,

the difference being about 10 to four."

There is evidently a large mistake in this statement. In all Confederate writings this claim of disparity of numbers is noticeable and difficult to be accounted for. Gen. Polk had arrived, and the Confederate army at this place was admitted by Hood to have been about 75,000. Gen. Sherman's force was at first, as we have seen, 38,797; then, diminished by a thousand casualties at Rocky Face and vicinity, and increased by Stoneman's cavalry, which did not exceed 4,000, we had a new aggregate of about 101,797. It is difficult to understand how Johnston can make it anywhere near 10 to four, or even two to one, against him! It is well, however, to remember what we have before frequently noticed that our opponents used the word "effectives," probably counting the actual number of men carrying rifles and carbines, plus the enlisted artillerymen actually with their

guns; whereas our officers counted in all present for duty, officers and men, no matter how multitudinous and varied the duties and details might be. It is plain, however, we come to our estimates, that the disparity between the actual armies was not very great at the battle of Resaca. We could not possibly put into line of battle, counting actual fighting elements, more than four men to Johnston's three.

With regard to "attacking promptly," that is easily said; but to attack at once on arrival at a new place with whose features no officers are familiar is seldom practicable. To do so it should require an immediate and thorough knowledge of the strength and position of your opposing forces, as well as of the approaches.

On the 14th of May, 1864, Polk, with

its artillery, formed as good an artificial obstacle against Hood as was possible.

Let us go now to Sherman's southernmost troops, and for a time confine our attention to the operations of the Army of the Tennessee. It will be remembered that Gen. McPherson, the commander, fell near Atlanta before the end of this campaign, so that, as I was his successor, his dispatches and records naturally fell to me. In making up my statement concerning this battle I said for the 9th of May: "The command on the lead (Gen. Dodge's Sixteenth Corps) pushed on, the cavalry in advance, till within about eight and one-half miles of the town (Resaca), when Kilpatrick encountered considerable infantry force, in the charging of which he was severely wounded and obliged to leave the field." That date

was an error. This wounding occurred in the manner and at the place described, but near noon on the 12th of May, instead of the 9th.

Kilpatrick, some time before transferred to the West, sustained on there his usual reputation for boldness and



GEN. GEORGE H. THOMAS.

activity in scouting, and for success in promptly clearing away the enemy's outposts. His wound did not long detain him from the field. He was too ambitious to stay in the rear.

The forward movement from Snake Creek Gap was taken up and completed during the 13th of May; one corps (Logan's Fifteenth) was deployed, and Gen. Venable's Division, of the Sixteenth, brought to its support. The firing at the front was noisy. The resistance of the enemy's skirmishers became greater and greater as Logan's lines neared Camp Creek and Resaca. Coming by-and-by to a treeless field, he discovered beyond the open stretch a north and south ridge not more than 1,000 yards distant. This high land was

ALREADY OCCUPIED

by Confederate artillery and held by Confederate infantry, moderately entrenched.

Quickly Logan, taking in the situation, had a battery well placed and put into action, and in a brief time succeeded in silencing the opposing cannon; then his brave men, in line, sprang forward, determined to clear the ridge and possess it. In that neighborhood, crossing the Resaca wagon-road, Gen. Logan's entire corps took permanent position; and one division of the Sixteenth, under the brave Gen. G. M. Dodge, formed on its right, and the whole front was speedily covered with breastworks and ditches. The town, Resaca, was now in plain sight, and the buildings and railway bridge were exposed to Logan's ceaseless artillery firing.

Sherman had instructed McPherson after his arrival, and just before the remainder of the army joined him, to throw toward his left and forward, and make an effort to seize Johnston's railroad line north of Resaca. To this end, during the 14th of May, several lively demonstrations were made by McPherson's army to carry out Sherman's instructions, or at least so much of them as would keep the Confederate Polk's men so busy that they could not reinforce Hood further north. There, should we judge by the sound, hard fighting was going on against Thomas and Schofield. Logan, writing of this affair, says:

"Gen. Osterhaus" (one of his division commanders) "took advantage of the feints to attack the enemy's skirmishers in the heavily-wooded valley near the road. This was done in the most gallant manner. The bridge over Camp Creek (the stream which separated us from the enemy) was carried, and the 12th Mo. were thrown forward into the woods previously occupied by

the enemy, thus forming a living tete du pont, which operation in the ensuing movement proved of great value."

From this bridge-head the Fifteenth Corps, supported by the Sixteenth, both belonging to McPherson's command, made a farther move.

DRIVING IN POLK'S ADVANCE from the high ground east of Camp Creek. The brigades most hotly engaged were those of Gens. Charles R. Woods and Giles A. Smith. The new position beyond the bridge was thus taken by them. It was most important and the enemy so believed, for Polk hotly contested the coveted ground; yet McPherson's men kept it against a fearfully hot fire, while the pioneers were bringing up the intrenching-tools. Assisted by many willing hands from the infantry-line, these implements were used so effectively that in a short time every exposed place was under the shelter of fair intrenchments.

In the early evening, about 7:30, the Confederates made an organized and vigorous assault upon this new line, but they were quickly repulsed. In anticipation of this evening entertainment, Lightburn's had been sent to the right of Giles A. Smith's Brigade, and other troops ran to the help of the troops of Gen. Charles R. Woods. All these soldiers were in time to participate in the action; and Lightburn himself, for his promptitude and energy, received from his seniors special commendation. A hundred-odd prisoners were taken, and some 1,300 Confederates were reported killed and wounded on that front in the skirmishes and the combat.

The importance of McPherson's capture of the heights, situated as they were between Camp Creek and the Oostanaula, cannot be doubted, for the high ground manned with our guns spoiled for Confederate transit both the railway and the wagon-road bridges, and caused the Confederates to lay a new bridge of boats further up the river. On this point Gen. Johnston, to our surprise, remarks:

"Gen. Sherman was misinformed as to the taking of an important ridge by the advance of McPherson's whole line and bloody repulses of Confederate attempts to retake it (this on the 15th); there was

NO SUCH OCCURRENCE.

But on the 14th, about dusk, the left of our line of skirmishers, 40 or 50 men, were driven from a slight elevation in front of our left, but no attempt was made to retake it."

Gen. Johnston was certainly mistaken, for there is no conflict in the reports. The number of killed and wounded on his front are too specific to make an error probable. Besides the official reports, I have the testimony of a reliable correspondent of the New York Herald, who was present. He wrote respecting McPherson's movement of the 14th:

"He (McPherson) had thrown Logan's Corps across the creek, and occupied the heights on the east bank of the stream overlooking the town. This movement had not been accomplished without hard fighting. The rebel batteries along the heights poured a dreadful storm of shot and shell upon Logan's advance. McPherson, in order to neutralize this, had placed batteries on the heights on the west bank of the stream, annoying the rebel batteries, and thus giving a chance to Logan to charge across the stream and take possession of the ridge of hills commanding the rebel position around Resaca."

Surely Johnston and not Sherman must have been misinformed. True, those heights were not within Johnston's continuous entrenched line, but they were important outposts, eminently so, when we notice that they so thoroughly commanded and in our possession endangered his railway communication with Resaca.

Before undertaking to detail the important part borne by Gen. George H. Thomas in the battle of Resaca, we will next follow the movements of Gen. Schofield, he being next in location. His was usually called the "Army of the Ohio," but when, as now, separated from its cavalry it had but one corps, the Twenty-third.

To go back a little, when McPherson, after his first backward movement, was again

PUSHING STRAIGHT FOR RESACA, the two corps, the Twentieth (Hooker), and Fourteenth (Palmer), of Thomas's army, were to keep abreast of him and on his left. As soon as McPherson and these two corps were in line, the whole north and south front of Johnston was pretty well covered. But Camp Creek, the dividing stream between us and our foe, near Palmer's left, made an abrupt up-stream bend toward the west, and the Confederate lines bent off in the opposite direction toward the Oostanaula.

Schofield's troops, as I saw them in motion, hastened in at this point, Gen. Judah's Division turning by a sort of right wheel on a pivot at the bend, and the energetic Cox's Division, trying to keep up the right wheel, swept off leftward while continually changing front to the right. Judah's men came up boldly, but were exposed to a double fire. Every step forward brought them under the Confederate batteries situated in elevated salients.

It was worse and worse for Judah as he pressed forward. Capt. Conyngham, in his book, gives a graphic account of Judah's advance. He says that before

(Continued on second page.)

STRUGGLING FOR SUPREMACY.

Some Operations in East Tennessee in 1863.

OPPOSING FORCES.

The Threefold Object to be Gained.

NO TIME LOST.

Plenty of Fighting Along the Whole Line.

GEN. LONG-STREET'S campaign in East Tennessee in November, 1863, culminating in the repulse of his assault upon Fort Sanders on the 30th of November, has already been fully described more than once in these columns.


After the fruitless attempts to capture the advance of the pursuing force at Bean's Station on the 20th of December, Longstreet's infantry returned to their camp at Rogersville, and went into Winter quarters. His cavalry, under command of Gen. Martin, took position in the vicinity of Dandridge. Russell's Brigade, of Morgan's Division, was posted four miles



GEN. S. D. STURGIS.

east of Dandridge, Crews's Brigade midway between Morristown and Dandridge, Armstrong's Division concentrated at Talbert's Depot, on the road leading from Morristown to New Market, all with instructions to

ATTACK FLANK AND REAR any foe that might attack either of the positions above mentioned.



The strength of the Confederate Cavalry Corps on the 31st of December as given in the returns of that month, was as follows:

| Abstract from official returns. | Effective total present. | | | |
|--|--------------------------|------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| | Cavalry. | Artillery. | Quartermasters. | Quartermasters. |
| J. T. Morgan's Division. | | | | |
| Russell's Brigade (Crews's Brigade) | 178 | 2,644 | 5 | 129 |
| Armstrong's Division. | | | | |
| Dibrell's Brigade (Harrison's Brigade) | 169 | 2,056 | 5 | 106 |
| Total | 347 | 4,700 | 10 | 235 |
| Ransom's Division, detached. | | | | |
| Gilmer's Brigade (W. E. Jones's Brigade) | 164 | 2,180 | 3 | 102 |
| Total cavalry | 511 | 6,880 | 13 | 337 |

Brig.-Gen. S. D. Sturgis superseded Gen. Shackelford in command of the Cavalry Corps of the Army of the Ohio on the 12th of December. The command consisted nominally of two divisions of two brigades each, but the long and wearisome marches over the mountains of East Tennessee had reduced the mount to such an extent that one-third of the men had no horses to ride. Gen. Sturgis established his camp at Blain's

Crossroads, and was indefatigable in obtaining information as to the position and movements of his antagonist, and, having ascertained through spies and reconnoissances the location of Gen. Martin's camps, reported the facts to Maj.



GEN. JAMES LONGSTREET.

Gen. Foster, commanding the Department of the Ohio.

In pursuance of orders given by Gen. Grant to Brig.-Gen. W. L. Elliott, commanding the Cavalry Corps of the Army of the Cumberland, that command, re-equipped for service, moved from Sparta, Tenn., early in December, and encamped at Kingston, whence, on the 15th, Gen. Elliott marched at the head of two brigades of Brig.-Gen. E. M. McCook's Division to co-operate with Gen. Sturgis in his operations against the Confederate cavalry.

Gen. Sturgis, being the ranking officer, assumed command of the entire force, when, after a

VEGETIOUS DELAY in crossing the Holston, swollen by recent rains, the junction was formed a week later.

The returns for Dec. 20 show the strength of both these commands as follows:

| | Cavalry. | | | | Artillery. | | | |
|---|-----------|-------|-----------|-------|------------|------|-----------|------|
| | Officers. | Men. | Officers. | Men. | Officers. | Men. | Officers. | Men. |
| Elliott's Cavalry, McCook's Division. | 84 | 1,297 | | | | | | |
| Campbell's Brigade | 120 | 1,822 | | | | | | |
| La Grange's Brigade | 27 | 216 | | | | | | |
| 7th Ky. Cav. | | | 4 | 79 | | | | |
| Lilly's Battery | | | | | | | | |
| Total | 231 | 3,305 | 4 | 79 | | | | |
| Sturgis's Cavalry and Mounted Infantry, Wofford's Division. | | | | | | | | |
| Adams's Brigade | 61 | 920 | | | | | | |
| Bond's Brigade | 28 | 1,458 | | | | | | |
| Allison's Battery | | | | | | | | |
| Total | 89 | 2,378 | | | | | | |
| Foster's Division. | | | | | | | | |
| Garrard's Brigade | 35 | 497 | | | | | | |
| Capron's Brigade | 43 | 438 | | | | | | |
| Total | 78 | 935 | | | | | | |
| Total cavalry and mounted infantry | 425 | 6,588 | 6 | 194 | | | | |
| Mott's Infantry Brigade | | | 83 | 1,553 | | | | |
| Total force | 511 | 8,141 | 13 | 2,908 | | | | |

The total number of officers and enlisted men in Gen. Sturgis's Cavalry

Corps present for duty at the same date was 6,089. Of this number Pennsacker's Brigade, 1,014 strong, was on detached service, and 1,541 men were dismounted.

The field of operations was in the mountainous region lying east of Knoxville. The season was the depth of Winter and very inclement.

The object to be gained was threefold: First, the interposition of a cavalry force between that of Gen. Martin and the infantry lines at Bean's Station and in the vicinity of Knoxville; second, to subvert the cavalrymen and horses; and, third, to protect the inhabitants, who, while sure of their deliverance from Confederate oppression, had been so pronounced in their expressions of loyalty to the United States Government as to have aroused the hostility of their Confederate neighbors.

The orders given Gen. Elliott by Maj.-Gen. Foster in person on the 15th were to cross the Holston River and attack the Confederate cavalry reported to be in the vicinity of Morristown. On the 16th Campbell's Brigade

CROSSED THE RIVER, barely fordable at Armstrong's Ford. The river was rising, and in the hope of finding the crossing more favorable higher up the stream the two brigades marched abreast, one on each side of the river, to Strawberry Plains, where Gen. Elliott reported by courier to Gen. Sturgis, who directed him to proceed f